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Abstract
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite popu-
lations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy
selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial
outcome. We study fixation time in this scenario. We show that the fixation time is divided
into three main regimes, in one of which the fixation time is short, and in the other two the fix-
ation time is exponentially long in terms of the population size. Different from the case without
zealots, there is a threshold selection intensity below which the fixation is fast for an arbitrary
payoff matrix. We illustrate our results with examples of various social dilemma games.
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1 Introduction
A standard assumption underlying evolutionary game dynamics, regardless of whether a player
is social agent or gene, is that players tend to imitate successful others. In actual social
evolutionary dynamics, however, there may be zealous players that stick to one option according
to their idiosyncratic preferences regardless of the payoff that they or their peers earn. Collective
social dynamics in the presence of zealots started to be examined for non-game situations such
as the voter model representing competition between two equally strong opinions (i.e., neutral
invasions) [1–5]. Zealots seem to be also relevant in evolutionary game dynamics. For example,
voluntary immunization behavior of individuals when epidemic spreading possibly occurs in
a population can be examined by a public-goods dilemma game [6]. In this situation, some
individuals may behave as zealot such that they try to immunize themselves regardless of the
cost of immunization [7].
In our previous work, we examined evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma and
snowdrift games in infinite populations with zealots [8]. Specifically, we assumed zealous co-
operators and asked the degree to which the zealous cooperators facilitate cooperation in the
entire population. We showed that cooperation prevails if the temptation of unilateral defection
is weak or the selection strength is weak. For the prisoner’s dilemma, we analytically obtained
the condition of cooperation.
In the present paper, we conduct a finite population analysis of evolutionary dynamics of
a general two-person game with zealots. Evolutionary games in finite populations have been
recognized as a powerful analytical tool for understanding properties of evolutionary games
such as conditions of cooperation in social dilemma games. In addition, the outcome for finite
populations is often different from that for infinite populations [9–11]. We take advantage of
this method to understand evolutionary dynamics of games with zealots for general matrix
games.
It should be noted that the fixation probability, i.e., the probability that a given strat-
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egy eventually dominates the population as a result of stochastic evolutionary dynamics, is a
primary quantity to be pursued in evolutionary dynamics in finite populations. Nevertheless,
fixation trivially occurs in the presence of zealots if all zealots are assumed to take the same
strategy; the zealots’ strategy always fixates. For example, if there is a single zealous cooper-
ator in the population, cooperation always fixates even in the conventional prisoner’s dilemma
game. However, in this adverse case, fixation of cooperation is expected to take long time; the
relevant question here is the fixation time [12–21]. Here we examine the mean fixation time of
the strategy selected by the zealots. This quantity serves as a probe to understand the extent
to which zealots influence non-zealous players in the population. The fixation time would be
affected by the payoff matrix, population size, number of zealous players, and strength of se-
lection. We derive the asymptotic dependence of the mean fixation time on the population size
when the fraction of zealots in the population is fixed. Mathematically, we extend the approach
taken in [12] to the case with zealots.
2 Model
We assume a well-mixed population of N +M players under evolutionary dynamics defined as
follows. In each discrete time unit, each player selects either of the two strategies A or B. Each
player plays a symmetric two-person game with all the other N +M − 1 players in a unit time.
The payoff matrix of the single game for the row player is given by


A B
A a b
B c d

. (1)
The fitness of a player on which the selection pressure operates is defined as the payoff summed
over the N +M − 1 opponents.
We assume that N players may flip the strategy according to the Moran process [17, 22].
We call these players the ordinary players. The other M players are zealots that never change
the strategy irrespectively of their fitness. Because our primary interest is in the possibility
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of cooperation in social dilemma games induced by zealous cooperators, we assume that all
zealots take strategy A; A is identified with cooperation in the case of a social dilemma game.
We also assume that a, b, c, d ≥ 0 for the Moran process to be well-defined.
Because we have assumed a well-mixed population, the state of the evolutionary process is
specified by the number of ordinary players selecting A, which we denote by i. In each time
step, we select an ordinary player with the equal probability 1/N . The strategy of the selected
player is updated. Then, we select a player, called the parent, whose strategy replaces that
of the previously selected player. The parent is selected with the probability proportional to
the fitness among the N +M players including the zealots and the player whose strategy is to
be replaced. The population size N is constant over time. It should be noted that a player is
updated once on average in time N .
Because the zealots always select A, the Moran process ends up with the unanimous popu-
lation of A players (we impose a > 0 for this to be true). In other words, fixation of A always
occurs such that the issue of fixation probability is irrelevant to our model.
3 Results
We calculate the mean fixation time and its approximation in the case of a large population
size by extending the framework developed in [12] (also see [17, 23–25]).
3.1 Mean fixation time: exact solution
Consider the state of the population in which i (0 ≤ i ≤ N) ordinary players select strategy A.
A total of i+M and N−i players, including the zealots, select strategies A and B, respectively.
The Moran process is equivalent to a random walk on the i space in which i = 0 is a reflecting
boundary, and i = N is the unique absorbing boundary.
The fitness of an A and B player is given by
fi =
(i+M − 1)a+ (N − i)b
N +M − 1 (2)
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and
gi =
(i+M)c + (N − i− 1)d
N +M − 1 , (3)
respectively. In a single time step, i increases by one, does not change, or decreases by one.
We denote by T+i and T
−
i the probabilities that i shifts to i+ 1 and i− 1, respectively. These
probabilities are given by
T+i =
N − i
N
(i+M)fi
(i+M)fi + (N − i)gi (4)
and
T−i =
i
N
(N − i)gi
(i+M)fi + (N − i)gi . (5)
We denote by ti the mean fixation time when there are initially i ordinary players with
strategy A. As shown in [17, pp. 86-91] (see Appendix A for a full derivation), we obtain
ti =
N−1∑
j=i
qj
j∑
k=0
1
T+k qk
, (6)
where
qk =
k∏
j=1
T−j
T+j
. (7)
In Eq. (7), we interpret q0 = 1.
3.2 Deterministic approximation of the random walk
In this section we classify the deterministic dynamics driven by the expected bias of the random
walk (i.e., T+i − T−i ) into three cases, as is done in the analysis of populations without zealots
[10, 12]. The obtained classification determines the dependence of the mean fixation time on
N , as we will show in section 3.3.
We first identify the equilibrium points of the deterministic dynamics, i.e., i satisfying
T+i = T
−
i . Equations (4) and (5) indicate that i = N always yields T
+
i = T
−
i = 0, corresponding
to the fact that i = N is the unique absorbing state. Other equilibria are derived from
(i+M) [(i+M − 1)a+ (N − i)b]− i [(i+M)c + (N − i− 1)d] = 0. (8)
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We set y ≡ i/N (0 ≤ y < 1), m ≡M/N , and ignore O(N−1) terms in Eq. (8) to obtain
f(y) ≡ (a− b− c+ d)y2 + [2ma+ (1−m)b−mc− d] y +m2a+mb = 0. (9)
We define
y˜ =− 1
2(a− b− c+ d) [2ma+ (1−m) b−mc− d] , (10)
D = [2ma + (1−m)b−mc− d]2 − 4m(ma+ b)(a− b− c+ d), (11)
y∗1 =
{
y˜ −
√
D
2(a−b−c+d) (a− b− c+ d 6= 0),
− m(ma+b)
2ma+(1−m)b−mc−d (a− b− c+ d = 0),
(12)
and
y∗2 =y˜ +
√
D
2(a− b− c+ d) . (13)
We will use y∗2 only when a − b − c + d > 0. In the continuous state limit, the deterministic
dynamics driven by T+i − T−i is classified into the following three cases, as summarized in
Table 1. The derivation is shown in Appendix B.
Case (i): f(y) > 0 holds true for all y (0 ≤ y ≤ 1) such that the dynamics starting from any initial
condition tends to y = 1 (Fig. 1(a)). In an infinite population, A dominates B. In a finite
population, we expect that the fixation time is short. This case occurs when c < (m+1)a
and one of the following conditions is satisfied:
• a− b− c + d ≤ 0.
• a− b− c + d > 0 and y∗1 ≤ 0 (i.e., 2ma + (−m+ 1)b−mc− d ≥ 0).
• a− b− c+ d > 0, 0 < y∗1 < 1 (i.e., 2ma+(−m+1)b−mc− d < 0 and −(2m+2)a+
(m+ 1)b+ (m+ 2)c− d < 0), and D ≤ 0.
• a− b− c + d > 0 and y∗1 ≥ 1 (i.e., −(2m+ 2)a+ (m+ 1)b+ (m+ 2)c− d ≥ 0).
Case (ii): f(y) = 0 has a unique solution y∗1 (0 < y
∗
1 < 1) such that the dynamics starting from any
initial condition converges to y∗1 (Fig. 1(b)). In an infinite population, A and B coexist.
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In a finite population, we expect that the fixation time is long. This case occurs when
c > (m+ 1)a.
Case (iii): f(y) = 0 has two solutions 0 < y∗1 < y
∗
2 < 1. Dynamics starting from 0 ≤ y < y∗2
converges to y∗1, and that starting from y
∗
2 < y < 1 converges to y = 1 (Fig. 1(c)). In an
infinite population, a mixture of A and B and the pure A configuration are bistable. In
a finite population, we expect that the fixation time is long if the dynamics starts with
0 ≤ y < y∗2 and short if it starts with y∗2 < y < 1. This case occurs when
c <(m+ 1)a, (14)
a− b− c+ d >0, (15)
0 <y˜ < 1, (16)
and
D > 0 (17)
are satisfied.
The condition given by Eq. (14) is related to the so-called cooperation facilitator assumed
in a previous model [26] as follows. Consider a hypothetical infinite population in which almost
all players select A, i.e., y ≈ 1. Then, the payoff that a player with strategy A gains by being
matched with the other ordinary players and zealous players is equal to (m+ 1)a. The payoff
that a player with strategy B gains by being matched with the other ordinary players, but not
zealous players, is equal to c. Therefore, Eq. (14) represents the condition for the stability of
the homogeneous population of strategy A against invasion by B when zealous players somehow
contribute to the payoff of ordinary A players and not to that of ordinary B players. Such a
zealous player is equivalent to the cooperation facilitator assumed in Ref. [26].
In the corresponding model without zealots, there are four scenarios: A dominates B
(Fig. 1(d)), B dominates A (Fig. 1(e)), a mixture of A and B is stable (Fig. 1(f)), and A
and B are bistable (Fig. 1(g)) [12]. The cases shown in Fig. 1(d), Fig. 1(f), and Fig. 1(g) are
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analogous to cases (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, for the game with zealots. The case shown in
Fig. 1(e) never occurs in the game with zealots because y tends to increase in the absence of A
owing to the fact that unanimity of B among the ordinary players is a reflecting boundary of
our model. In fact, this case corresponds to case (ii) for the presence of zealots (Fig. 1(b)). If
we set m→ 0, we obtain case (i) when a− c > 0 and b− d > 0, case (ii) when a− c < 0, and
case (iii) when a − c > 0 and b − d < 0. As is consistent with [12], the classification depends
only on the a− c and b− d values. However, the scenario in which B dominates A (Fig. 1(e))
does not happen even with the vanishing density of zealots (i.e., m→ 0) because the unanimity
of B remains to be a reflecting boundary as long as there is at least one zealot.
3.3 Mean fixation time: large N limit
In this section, we analyze the order of the mean fixation time in terms of N when N is large.
We assume that the fraction of zealots in the population, i.e., m = M/N , is fixed. Because the
mean fixation time is by definition the largest for i = 0, i.e., the initial condition in which all
ordinary players select B, we focus on t0. To evaluate t0, we rewrite Eq. (6) for i = 0 as
t0 =
N−1∑
k=0
1
T+k qk
N−1∑
j=k
qj . (18)
3.3.1 Case (i)
We obtain
T−i
T+i
= 1− Nf(i/N)
(i+M)[(i+M − 1)a+ (N − i)b] , (19)
where f(y) (0 ≤ y < 1) is given by Eq. (9). In case (i), f(y) > 0 holds true. Therefore,
T−i
T+i
≤ sup
0≤y<1
{
1− f(y)
(y +m)[(y +m)a+ (1− y)b]
}
≡ε < 1 (20)
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is satisfied for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. By using Eq. (20), we obtain
1
qk
N−1∑
j=k
qj =
N−1∑
j=k
j∏
ℓ=k+1
T−ℓ
T+ℓ
≤
N−1∑
j=k
ε(j−k−1) ≤ 1
ε
1
1− ε. (21)
Because the left-hand side of Eq. (21) is at least unity, we obtain
t0 ∝
N−1∑
k=0
1
T+k
. (22)
The substitution of y = i/N and m = M/N in Eq. (4) yields
1
T+i
=
1
1− y +
(y +m)c + (1− y)d
(y +m) [(y +m)a+ (1− y)b] . (23)
In particular, we obtain
1
T+i
≈ 1
1− y (y ≈ 1). (24)
Equation (24) implies that
t0 ∝ N lnN. (25)
This result coincides with the previous result for the absence of zealots [12].
3.3.2 Case (ii)
In Case (ii), T+i − T−i > 0 for 0 ≤ i < Ny∗1 and T+i − T−i < 0 for Ny∗1 < i < N . Therefore, qi
takes the minimum at i ≈ Ny∗1. We denote the value of i that satisfies i < Ny∗1 and qi ≈ qN−1
by i∗. Such an i∗ exists if q0 ≥ qN−1. If q0 < qN−1, we regard that i∗ = 0. Using the relationship
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qi = [q˜(i/N)]
N for a function q˜(y) (0 ≤ y < 1) [12] (also see Appendix C), we obtain
t0 =
N−1∑
k=0
1
T+k qk
N−1∑
j=k
qj
∼
N−1∑
k=0
1
T+k qk
max{qk, qN−1}
∼
N−1∑
k=i∗
qN−1
qk
∼
√
N
[
q˜(1)
q˜(y∗)
]N
, (26)
where
q˜(y∗) = min
0≤y<1
q˜(y). (27)
To derive the last line in Eq. (26), we used the steepest descent method [12] (also see Ap-
pendix D).
Equations (23) and (24) imply that 1/T+k in Eq. (26) is safely ignored near the singularity
at y ≈ 1 because it would contribute at most ∝ N lnN to the fixation time. Therefore, we
obtain
t0 ∝
√
N exp(γN), (28)
where γ > 0 is a constant that depends on a, b, c, d, and m. The dependence of γ on m is
shown in Fig. 2 for sample payoff matrices for the prisoner’s dilemma game (solid line) and
snowdrift game (dotted line). For both games, γ monotonically decreases with m, implying
that the fixation time decreases with m. In particular, γ is equal to zero, which corresponds to
t0 ∝ N lnN , when m is larger than a threshold value.
3.3.3 Case (iii)
In this case, qi takes a local minimum at i = Ny
∗
1 and a local maximum at i = Ny
∗
2. Therefore,
behavior of the random walk in the range 0 ≤ i < Ny∗2 is qualitatively the same as that for case
(ii), and that in the range Ny∗2 < i < N is qualitatively the same as that for case (i). Because
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the former part makes the dominant contribution to the fixation time, the scaling of the mean
fixation time is given by Eq. (28).
Case (iii) occurs when strategy A is disadvantageous when it is rare and advantageous when
it is frequent. The coordination game provides such an example (section 5.4).
3.3.4 Summary and the borderline case
In summary, the mean fixation time in the limit of large N is given by t0 ∝ N lnN in case
(i) and t0 ∝
√
N exp(γN) (γ > 0) in cases (ii) and (iii). For the parameter values on the
boundary between the two scaling regimes, the same arguments as those for the model without
zealots [12] lead to t0 ∝ N3/2.
4 Dependence of the mean fixation time on the selection
strength
We examine the influence of the selection strength, denoted by w, on the mean fixation time.
To this end, we redefine the fitness to an A and B player by 1 − w + wfi and 1 − w + wgi,
respectively, where fi and gi are given by Eqs. (2) and (3) (e.g., [9, 11]). Consequently, we
replace the payoff matrix given by Eq. (1) by


A B
A 1− w + wa 1− w + wb
B 1− w + wc 1− w + wd

. (29)
Equation (1) is reproduced with w = 1.
For sufficiently weak selection, we obtain t0 ∝ N lnN , i.e., case (i), regardless of the payoff
matrix. To prove this statement, we note that, by using the payoff matrix shown in Eq. (29),
condition c < (m+ 1)a in the case of w = 1 is generalized to
c < (m+ 1)a+m
(
1
w
− 1
)
. (30)
11
Therefore, if the original game in the case of w = 1 belongs case (ii), i.e., c > (m + 1)a, the
game belongs to case (i) or (iii) (Table 1) if Eq. (30), or equivalently,
w < w1 ≡ m
c− (m+ 1)a+m (31)
is satisfied. For a fixed payoff matrix, w1 monotonically increases with m, consistent with the
intuition that existence of zealots would lessen the fixation time.
Next, the sign of a − b − c + d is not affected by the selection strength. Therefore, we
assume a − b − c + d > 0 and prove that a condition for case (iii), i.e., Eq. (17), is violated
with a sufficiently small w. Because the value of y˜ given by Eq. (10) is also unaffected by w,
we start with assuming 0 < y˜ < 1, which is a necessary condition for case (iii) (Eq. (16); see
Appendix B). The condition D < 0 in the case of w = 1, where D is defined by Eq. (11), is
generalized to
wD − 4(1− w)m(m+ 1)(a− b− c+ d) < 0. (32)
Because the condition imposed on D, which distinguishes cases (i) and (iii), is relevant only for
a− b− c+ d > 0 (Table 1), Eq. (32) is satisfied for an arbitrary payoff matrix if
w < w2 ≡ 4m(m+ 1)(a− b− c+ d)
D + 4m(m+ 1)(a− b− c+ d) . (33)
Therefore, case (iii) is excluded with a sufficiently small w value.
The threshold value of w below which t0 ∝ N lnN , which we denote by wc, is given by
wc =


min{w1, w2, 1} (w1 > 0, w2 > 0),
min{w1, 1} (w1 > 0, w2 < 0),
min{w2, 1} (w1 < 0, w2 > 0),
1 (w1 < 0, w2 < 0).
(34)
We can alternatively introduce the selection strength by replacing Eqs. (2) and (3) to redefine
the fitness by
fi = exp
[
β
(i+M − 1)a+ (N − i)b
N +M − 1
]
(35)
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and
gi = exp
[
β
(i+M)c + (N − i− 1)d
N +M − 1
]
, (36)
where β is the selection strength [27]. In Appendix E, we show that qualitatively the same
result holds true in the sense that there is a threshold value of β below which the fixation is
fast irrespective of the a, b, c, d, and m values. It should be noted that, with Eqs. (35) and
(36), a, b, c, and d are allowed to take negative values.
5 Examples
We compare the mean fixation time for some games with that for the neutral game, i.e.,
a = b = c = d > 0. In the absence of zealots, the neural game yields T+i = T
−
i (1 ≤ i ≤ N −1).
The random walk is unbiased, and the so-called mean conditional fixation time is equal to
N(N−1) [12]. The mean conditional fixation time is defined as the mean fixation time starting
from state i = 1 under the condition that the absorbing state at i = N , not i = 0, is reached.
The neutral game in the presence of zealots yields T+0 > T
−
0 = 0 and T
+
i /T
−
i = (i +M)/i
(1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1). Therefore, the random walk is biased toward i = N for all i. More precisely,
we obtain
t0 = N(N +M)
∑
0≤k≤i≤N−1
i!(k +M)!
k!(i+M)!
1
(N − i)(i+M) . (37)
As in Ref. [12], we say that fixation is fast (slow) if t0 is smaller (larger) than the value given
by Eq. (37). It should be noted that t0 ∝ N lnN for the neutral game because it corresponds
to w = 0 < wc.
5.1 Constant selection
As a first example, consider the case of frequency-independent selection such that A and B are
equipped with fitness r and 1 (under w = 1), respectively. When a = b = r and c = d = 1, the
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threshold selection strength below which t0 ∝ N lnN , i.e., case (i), holds true is given by
wc =
{
m
(m+1)(1−r)
(
r ≤ 1
m+1
)
,
1
(
r ≥ 1
m+1
)
.
(38)
If w > wc, case (ii) occurs. Even if A is disadvantageous to B, A fixates fast with the help of
zealots regardless of the selection strength if 1/(m+ 1) < r < 1. This condition is more easily
satisfied when m is larger.
5.2 Prisoner’s dilemma game
Consider the prisoner’s dilemma game with a standard payoff matrix given by a = 1, b = 0,
c = T , and d = 0, where T > 1. Strategies A and B represent cooperation and defection,
respectively. It should be noted that a− b− c+ d < 0. With a general selection strength, the
conditions derived in section 3.2 imply that t0 ∝ N lnN , i.e., case (i), if T < 1 + m/w, and
t0 ∝
√
N exp(γN) with case (ii) if T > 1 +m/w. This condition coincides with that for the
dominance of cooperators in the case of the infinite population [8].
The mean fixation time with w = 1 and m = 0.2 obtained by direct calculations of Eq. (18)
is shown in Fig. 3(a). In this and the following figures, the t0 values are those normalized by
that for the neutral game [Eq. (37)]. The behavior of t0 is qualitatively different according to
whether T is larger or smaller than 1+m/w = 1.2. If T < 1.2, the ratio of t0 for the prisoner’s
dilemma game to t0 for the neutral game seems to approach a constant as N → ∞. This is
consistent with case (i). In contrast, if T > 1.2, t0 grows rapidly, which is consistent with case
(ii). To be more quantitative, 400
√
N exp(γN) divided by the t0 value for the neutral game
is shown by the dashed line in Fig. 3(a). It should be noted that 400 is a constant for fitting
and that γ value is theoretically determined as described in section 3.3.2. The theory (dashed
line) agrees well with the exact numerical results (thinnest solid line). We remark that the
normalized t0 behaves non-monotonically in N ; it takes a minimum at an intermediate value
of N .
Next, to examine the effect of the selection strength, we set T = 1.2 and m = 0.1. The
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mean fixation time as a function of N and w is shown in Fig. 3(b). Equation (34) implies that
t0 ∝ N lnN when w < wc = 0.5. Consistent with this result, t0 grows fast as a function of N
when w is large (i.e., w = 0.7 and 1). In particular, for w = 1, 400
√
N exp(γN) normalized by
the t0 value for the neutral game (dashed line in Fig. 3(b)) agrees well with the exact results
(thin solid line). For small w (i.e., w = 0.4), t0 seems to scale with N lnN (thick solid line).
Figure 3(c) shows the dependence of t0 on N for different densities of zealots (i.e., m). It
should be noted that the baseline t0 value derived from the neutral game depends on the value
of m. Because we set T = 1.2 and w = 1 in Fig. 3(c), the threshold value of m is equal to
0.2. In fact, the normalized t0 diverges according to ∝
√
N exp(γN) when m = 0.1 (dashed
line and thick solid line), whereas it seems to converge to a constant value when m = 0.3 (thin
solid line).
Figure 3 indicates that t0 for the prisoner’s dilemma game is always larger than that for
the neutral game (i.e., the normalized t0 is larger than unity). This is consistent with the
intuition that cooperation is difficult to attain in the prisoner’s dilemma game as compared to
the neutral game.
Finally, consider the symmetrized donation game, which is another standard form of the
prisoner’s dilemma game, given by a = b′−c′, b = −c′, c = b′, and d = 0, where b′ is the benefit,
and c′(< b′) is the cost. For the Moran process to be well-defined, we require 1− w + wb ≥ 0,
i.e., w < 1/(1 + c′). For this payoff matrix, we obtain
wc =
{
m
m−b′+(1+m)c′
(
b′
c′
≤ m+1
m
)
,
1
(
b′
c′
≥ m+1
m
)
.
(39)
Fixation occurs fast for a large benefit-to-cost ratio, large m, or small selection strength.
5.3 Snowdrift game
In this section, we examine the snowdrift game [28–30] defined by a = β − 0.5, b = β − 1,
c = β, and d = 0, where β > 1. Strategies A an B are identified as cooperation and defection,
respectively. Each player is tempted to defect if the other player cooperates, as in the prisoner’s
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dilemma game. However, different from the prisoner’s dilemma game, a player is better off by
cooperating if the partner defects; mutual defection is the worst outcome. In the infinite well-
mixed population without zealots, the game has the unique mixed Nash equilibrium in which
the fraction of cooperation is equal to (2β − 2)/(2β − 1).
Numerical evidence for the replicator dynamics, corresponding to an infinite population,
suggests that cooperation is dominant if m is large or w is small [8]. For the finite population,
we obtain
wc =
{
2m
3m−2mβ+1
(
β ≤ m+1
2m
)
,
1
(
β ≥ m+1
2m
)
.
(40)
If w < wc, we obtain t0 ∝ N lnN , i.e., case (i). If w > wc, we obtain t0 ∝
√
N exp(γN) with
case (ii). A large value of β or m makes the fixation time smaller. This result makes sense
because a large β generally favors cooperation.
5.4 Coordination game
The coordination game given by a = d > 0 and b = c = 0 has two pure Nash equilibria in
the infinite well-mixed population without zealots. For a finite population in the presence of
zealots, Eq. (34) yields
wc =


8m(m+1)
a(−4m2−4m+1)+8m(m+1)
(
0 ≤ m ≤
√
2−1
2
)
,
1
(√
2−1
2
≤ m ≤ 1
)
.
(41)
If w < wc, we obtain t0 ∝ N lnN , i.e., case (i). It should be noted that any strength of
selection 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 yields t0 ∝ N lnN if there are sufficiently many zealots, similar to the
game with constant selection, prisoner’s dilemma game, and snowdrift game. If w > wc, we
obtain t0 ∝
√
N exp(γN) with case (iii).
The mean first-passage time from state 0 (i.e., all ordinary players select B) to state i, i.e.,∑i−1
j=0 σj , is shown in Fig. 4. It should be noted that t0 is equal to this first-passage time to
exit i = N . We set N = 200, a = d = 1, b = c = 0, m = 0.2, and w = 1. Equation (41) implies
wc = 48/49 for these parameter values. Because w = 1 > wc, we obtain case (iii).
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The first-passage time increases slowly as i increases when i is small. It rapidly increases
with i for intermediate values of i, Once the random walker passes the critical i value, it feels
a positive bias such that the first-passage time only gradually increases with i for large i. The
values of i that separate the three regimes are roughly consistent with the analytical estimates
y∗1 = 0.1 and y
∗
2 = 0.2 [Eqs. (12) and (13)]. It should be noted that the first-passage time shows
representative behavior of case (iii) although w is only slightly larger than wc.
6 Discussion
We extended the results for the fixation time under the Moran process [12] to the case of a
population with zealous players. Similar to the case without zealots [12], we identified three
regimes in terms of the payoff matrix, number of zealots, and selection strengths. In one
regime, the fixation time is small (i.e., ∝ N lnN). In the other two regimes, it is large (i.e.,
∝ √N exp(γN) with γ > 0). We illustrated our results with representative games including
the prisoner’s dilemma game, snowdrift game, and coordination game.
Zealots have several impacts on evolutionary dynamics in finite populations. First, fixation
of one strategy A always occurs with zealots because we assumed that all zealots permanently
take A. Second, there is a case in which fixation is fast if the fraction of A players is sufficiently
large, whereas fixation is slow if the fraction of A is small. This scenario occurs for the coordi-
nation game. In the absence of zealots, the same game shows bistability such that the fixation
to the unanimity of A or that of B occurs fast [12]. Third, for a selection strength smaller
than a threshold value, the fixation is fast for any payoff matrix. In the absence of zealots, the
dependence of the mean fixation time on N for large N values is completely determined by the
signs of a−c and b−d [12]. Therefore, the scaling of the mean fixation time on N is independent
of the selection strength because manipulating the selection strength does not change the sign
of the effective a− c or b−d value. If the payoff matrix is given in the slow fixation regime, the
fixation is exponentially slow even for a small selection strength. In contrast, in the presence
of zealots, slow fixation can be accelerated if we lessen the selection strength.
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Mobilia examined the prisoner’s dilemma game with cooperation facilitators [26]. A coop-
eration facilitator was assumed to cooperate with cooperators and not to play with defectors.
The cooperation facilitator and zealous cooperator in the present study are common in that
they never change the strategy. However, they are different. First, zealous cooperators are
embedded in a well-mixed population such that they myopically cooperate with defectors as
well as cooperators. Second, the ordinary players may imitate the zealous cooperator’s strat-
egy (i.e., cooperation). In contrast, players do not imitate the cooperation facilitator’s strategy
(i.e., cooperation) in Mobilia’s model. As a consequence, cooperation does not always fixate in
his model.
Examination of the case of imperfect zealots, in which zealots change the strategy with a
small probability [8], warrants future work.
18
Appendix A: Derivation of Eq. (6)
Denote by Pi(t) the probability that the random walker starting from state i at time 0 is
absorbed to state N at time t. The normalization is given by
∑∞
t=0 Pi(t) = 1. It should be
noted that PN(0) = 1 and PN(t) = 0 (t ≥ 1). The mean fixation time when i ordinary players
initially select strategy A is given by
ti =
∞∑
t=0
tPi(t). (42)
It should be noted that tN = 0.
Pi(t) satisfies the recursion relation given by
Pi(t) = T
−
i Pi−1(t− 1) + (1− T−i − T+i )Pi(t− 1) + T+i Pi+1(t− 1). (43)
By multiplying both sides of Eq. (43) by t and taking the summation over t, we obtain
ti = T
−
i ti−1 + (1− T−i − T+i )ti + T+i ti+1 + 1. (44)
In terms of σi ≡ ti − ti+1, Eq. (44) can be rewritten as
T−i σi−1 − T+i σi + 1 = 0. (45)
The solution of Eq. (45) is given by
σi = σ0qi + qi
i∑
k=1
1
T+k qk
, (46)
where 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 and qi is given by Eq. (7).
We set i = 0 in Eq. (44) and use T−0 = 0 to obtain
t0 = (1− T+0 )t0 + T+0 t1 + 1. (47)
Therefore, we obtain
σ0 = t0 − t1 = 1
T+0
. (48)
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Using Eq. (48), we reduce Eq. (46) to
σi = qi
i∑
k=0
1
T+k qk
. (49)
The mean fixation time is given by
ti =
N−1∑
j=i
σj + tN
=
N−1∑
j=i
qj
j∑
k=0
1
T+k qk
. (50)
Appendix B: Classification of the deterministic dynamics
induced by the biased random walk
B.1 When a− b− c+ d < 0
We obtain d2f(y)/dy2 < 0 for a− b− c+ d < 0. Because
f(0) =m2a+mb > 0, (51)
f(1) =(m+ 1)2a− (m+ 1)c, (52)
where we used the assumption a > 0 in Eq. (51), we distinguish the following two cases. If
c < (m + 1)a, f(y) > 0 is satisfied for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, yielding case (i) in the main text. If
c > (m+ 1)a, a certain y∗1(0 < y
∗
1 < 1) exists such that f(y) > 0 for 0 ≤ y < y∗1, and f(y) < 0
for y∗1 < y ≤ 1. Therefore, case (ii) occurs.
B.2 When a− b− c+ d > 0
We obtain d2f(y)/dy2 > 0 for a− b− c+ d > 0. In this situation, Eq. (51) holds true.
If f(1) < 0, i.e., c > (m + 1)a, a certain y∗1 (0 < y
∗
1 < 1) exists such that f(y) > 0 for
0 ≤ y < y∗1, and f(y) < 0 for y∗1 < y ≤ 1. Therefore, case (ii) occurs.
Suppose that f(1) > 0, i.e., c < (m+ 1)a. To analyze this case, let us write
f(y) = (a− b− c+ d)(y − y˜)2 +m2a +mb− [2ma + (1−m)b−mc− d]
2
4(a− b− c+ d) , (53)
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where
y˜ = −2ma + (1−m)b−mc− d
2(a− b− c+ d) . (54)
(i) If y˜ ≤ 0, i.e., 2ma + (−m + 1)b − mc − d ≥ 0, we obtain f(y) ≥ f(0) > 0 for y ≥ 0.
Therefore, case (i) occurs.
(ii) If y˜ ≥ 1, i.e., −(2m+ 2)a+ (m+ 1)b+ (m+ 2)c− d ≥ 0, then f(y) ≥ f(1) > 0, yielding
case (i).
(iii) If 0 < y˜ < 1, we have the following two subcases:
(a) If D = [2ma + (1−m)b−mc− d]2 − 4m(ma + b)(a− b − c+ d) > 0, f(y) = 0 has
two solutions 0 < y∗1 < y
∗
2 < 1. In the deterministic dynamics driven by the bias
T+i −T−i , y∗1 and y∗2 are stable and unstable, respectively. Therefore, case (iii) occurs.
(b) If D ≤ 0, we obtain f(y) ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ y < 1, where the equality holds true only
when D = 0 and y = y˜. Therefore, case (i) occurs.
B.3 When a− b− c+ d = 0
The quadratic term in f(y) disappears when a−b−c+d = 0. The classification of the dynamics
in this case coincides with that for a− b− c + d < 0.
Appendix C: Derivation of q˜(y)
To derive the relationship qi = [q˜(i/N)]
N , we write
qi =exp
(
i∑
k=1
ln
T−k
T+k
)
=exp
{
i∑
k=1
ln
k [(k +M)c + (N − k − 1)d]
(k +M) [(k +M − 1)a+ (N − k)b]
}
≈ exp
{
N
∫ y
0
ln
y′ [(y′ +m)c+ (1− y′)d]
(y′ +m) [(y′ +m)a + (1− y′)b]dy
′
}
, (55)
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where y = i/N and y′ = k/N . Because the integral on the right-hand side of Eq. (55) is
independent of N , we obtain qi = [q˜(y)]
N . It should be noted that q˜(0) = 1 is consistent with
q0 = 1.
Appendix D: Steepest descent method
As done in [12], we use the steepest descent method to evaluate
∑N−1
k=i∗(qN−1/qk) in Eq. (26) as
follows:
N−1∑
k=i∗
qN−1
qk
∼
N−1∑
k=i∗
[
q˜(1)
q˜(k/N)
]N
∼N
∫ 1
i∗
N
[
q˜(1)
q˜(y′)
]N
dy′
=N
[
q˜(1)
q˜(y∗)
]N ∫ 1
i∗
N
exp
[
−
ln q˜(y
′)
q˜(y∗)
1
N
]
dy′ (56)
where q˜(y∗) = min0≤y<1 q˜(y). We approximate the integral by a Gaussian integral to obtain∫
exp
[
−F (y
′)
λ
]
dy′ ≈
√
2piλ
F ′′(y∗)
exp
[
−F (y
∗)
λ
]
(57)
with F (y′) = ln [q˜(y′)/q˜(y∗)] and λ = 1/N such that
N−1∑
k=k∗
qN−1
qk
∼
√
N
[
q˜(1)
q˜(y∗)
]N
. (58)
Appendix E: Weak selection introduced via an exponen-
tial function leads to fast fixation
Assume that the fitness of an A and B player is given by Eqs. (35) and (36), respectively. Then,
we obtain
T−i
T+i
=
igi
(i+M)fi
=exp
{
β
[(i+M)c+ (N − i− 1)d]− [(i+M − 1)a+ (N − i)b]
N +M − 1 + ln
i
i+M
}
. (59)
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If T−i /T
+
i < 1, i.e.,
β
[(i+M)c + (N − i− 1)d]− [(i+M − 1)a+ (N − i)b]
N +M − 1 + ln
i
i+M
< 0 (60)
holds true for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) and N , the fixation occurs fast (i.e., t0 ∝ N lnN). By
substituting y = i/N and m = M/N in Eq. (60) and ignoring O(N−1) terms, we obtain
β
(x+m)(c− a) + (1− x)(d− b)
1 +m
< ln
x+m
x
. (61)
Because the right-hand side of Eq. (61) is positive, there exists βc > 0 (including the case
βc = ∞) such that t0 ∝ N lnN when 0 ≤ β < βc. It should be noted that, in contrast to
the assumption throughout the present article, a, b, c, and d are allowed to be negative in the
present analysis because fi and gi given by Eqs. (35) and (36) are positive irrespective of the
a, b, c, and d values.
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Table 1: Classification of the three cases of the mean fixation time when N is large.
a− b− c+ d ≤ 0 a− b− c+ d > 0
c < (m+ 1)a case (i) case (i) or (iii)
c > (m+ 1)a case (ii) case (ii)
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Figure 1: Schematic classification of the deterministic dynamics driven by T+i − T−i . (a)–(c)
Populations with zealots. (d)–(g) Populations without zealots. Filled and open circles represent
stable and unstable equilibria, respectively. Filled squares represent the absorbing boundary
condition. It should be noted that we identify y = i/N .
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Figure 2: The exponent γ for the mean fixation time (Eq. (28)) plotted against the density of
zealots m for the prisoner’s dilemma game with a = 1, b = 0, c = 1.2, and d = 0 (solid line)
and the snowdrift game with a = β − 0.5, b = β, c = β − 1, d = 0, with β = 1.5 (dotted line).
We calculated γ on the basis of Eqs. (26), (27), and (55).
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Figure 3: The normalized mean fixation time for the prisoner’s dilemma game as a function
of N . We set a = 1, b = 0, c = T , and d = 0. In (a), we set m = 0.2 and w = 1. In (b),
we set T = 1.2 and m = 0.1. In (c), we set T = 1.2 and w = 1. The dashed lines represent
400
√
N exp(γN) divided by the t0 value for the neutral game.
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Figure 4: Mean first-passage time for the coordination game. We set N = 200, a = d = 1,
b = c = 0, m = 0.2, and w = 1.
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